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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HYDROSWIFT CORPORATION, )
Pl am
. t'f'f
t
a corporation,
i - A ppell an,
1

I'
vs.
LOUIE'S BOATS & MOTORS, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent. 1

Case No.
12507

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff against defendant for conversion of two motor boats, which were
sold in the State of Utah but converted in the State of
Oregon, plaintiff claiming personal jurisdiction over defendant under the long arm statute of Utah.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LO,VER COURT
The lower court, upon motion to quash service of
summons, entered its order quashing the service on the
basis that the Court had no jurisdiction over defendant.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks to reverse the lower court's
ruling quashing service of summons, and for a ruling in
its favor adjudging that the lower court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its
principal place of business at Salt Lake City, Utah.
The defendant-respondent is an Oregon corporation with places of business at Portland and Albany,
Oregon.
The plaintiff-appellant is a manufacturing concern
engaged in the manufacture of various types and kinds
of fiberglass motor boats, which it sells throughout the
Western United States, the boats being built at its plant
on West 21st South Street in Salt Lake County, Utah.
Plaintiff-appellant entered into a contract to build
for defendant numerous boats of various types and kinds,
to be delivered over a protracted period of time ( R-14
through 26) . The original orders were made in September, 1968.
On or about the 14th day of January, 1970, plaintiff sold additional boats to defendant, at defendant's
instance and request (R-28, 29) totalling $19,340.00. In
issuing the invoice for the purchase of the boats, plain2

tiff showed the purchaser to be First National Bank of
Oregon, 300 West First Avenue, Albany, Oregon; however, the boats were shipped to defendant who duly received the same. This procedure was followed as it was
the understanding of plaintiff that the First National
Bank of Oregon was to finance the boats for defendant.
The First National Bank of Oregon, after the delivery
of the boats to defendant, refused to honor the invoice
and refused to pay them. The defendant sold some of the
boats and remitted to plaintiff part of the money due,
but has refused to return the other boats or to pay for
them, thereby converting them to their own purposes.
Defendat admits receiving the boats and does not deny
still having them, but makes no tender back of said boats
or in any way asserts any legal or equitable rights to
possession of the boats ( R-19) .
Upon these facts, the plaintiff filed its amended
complaint alleging conversion of two of the boats covered
by the invoice (R-35), and sought to avail itself of personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to 78-2722 through 28, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended
by the Session Laws of 1969, the law commonly known
as the Utah Long Arm Statute.
Affidavits and counter-affidavits were filed by the
parties, wherein the defendant denied that it converted
the boats but failed to deny that it had possession of the
same or that it had paid for them, but in fact inferred
that it still had the boats but was refusing to pay for
them and also refusing to return them to plaintiff.
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The Court made and entered its order quashing
service of summons ( R-51, 52) and plaintiff timely filed
its notice of appeal.
ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE UTAH LONG ARM STATUTE INVOKED JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT.
Under the traditional concepts of due process of
law, the holding of personal jurisdiction over a foreign
resident or corporation not doing business within a state
has been held to be a violation of due process of law. The
earliest cases traditionally held to the concept that fair
play dictated that one must be physically within the jurisdiction of the Court before the Court had jurisdiction
to effect him by orders or judgments. This concept was
announced in the early United States Supreme Court
case of Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed.
465. In this case, the Supreme Court established the doctrine that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be violated where a nonresident individual defendant or foreign corporation is bound by a
personal judgment rendered by a court where the individual was served outside the jurisdiction or by substituted service.
Since this case, however, the trend throughout the
United States has been to expand the doctrine of jurisdiction over non-residents. It was not, however, until
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1945 that the Supreme Court reversed the old concepts
of Pennoyer v. IV elf, and expanded the doctrine of nonresident jurisdiction by its ruling in the case of International Shoe Company v. W a.shington ( 1945), 326
U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154, 161ALR1059. In
the International Shoe case, the Supreme Court spoke of
and laid down as a guideline the "minimal (minimum)
contacts" theory as a test of whether or not a state could
acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident individual or corporation.
Following the International Shoe Company case,
many states adopted what are known as "long arm" statutes which have for the most part been declared to be
constitutional by the various states wherein the question
as to their constitutionality have been raised.
Utah, in its traditional role as a conservative state,
was somewhat late in coming into the game of the "long
arm" statute business, and it was not until 1969 that the
Utah Legislature passed what is now known as the Utah
Long Arm Statute, codified as 78-27-22 through 28.
The Utah Legislature, in setting forth the policy of
the long arm statute ( 78-27-22), follows the concept of
the International Shoe case in the requiring of "certain
significant minimal contacts within this state" as a guideline in determining whether or not the courts will have
jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation or individual.
The policy of the state in enacting its long arm statute, and the need therefor, is set forth in 78-27-22, which
states as follows :
5

"Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Purpose of
act. - It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest demands the
state provide its citizens with an effective means
of redress against nonresident persons, who
through certain significant minimal contacts with
this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to
the state's protection. This legislative action is
deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of
commerce between the several states resulting in
increased interaction between persons of this state
and persons of other states."
"The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum
protection to citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants to the fulle_st extent permitted by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
The question now that the Supreme Court has to
decide, is what constitutes a "certain significant minimal
contact within this state," under this statutory enactment.
This same problem has beset the Federal and State
Courts in other jurisdictions which have a substantially
similar statutory enactment as Utah. In determining this
question it is necessary to not only look to the rationale
of the International Shoe Company case, but to several
later cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. In the case of McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220, 2 L.Ed. 2d 223, 78
S.Ct. 199, the Supreme Court held that California courts,
through its long arm statute, would have jurisdiction
over an insurance company which had written only one
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insurance policy within the state of California. It has
been argued both pro and con that the McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. case is restricted to insurance
companies only. In the later case of Hanson v. Benckla
( 1958), 357 U.S. 235, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S.Ct. 1228,
reh den, 358 U.S. 858, 3 L.Ed. 2d 92, 79 S.Ct. 10, the
Supreme Court rejected jurisdiction over a foreign
trustee and laid down the criteria that the minimal contact rule varies from case to case, and with the quality
and nature of the defendant's alleged activity, but that it
is necessary that there "be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the foreign state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." The Hanson v. Benckla
case centered around an attempt by the Florida courts
to impose its jurisdiction upon a Delaware trustee of
property located in Delaware, the Florida court asserting its right to jurisdiction based upon the fact that the
decedent who had owned the property had resided in
Florida at the time of her death. The Supreme Court
pointed out:
"In McGee, the court noted the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.
As technological pi:ogress has increased the flow
of commerce between states, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
has evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v.
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Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565, to the flexible
standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154, 161
ALR 1057. But it is a mistake to assume that this
trend held the ventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdiction of state courts. (Citing
cases)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth
three rules in determining whether or not a state court
may apply its long arm statute, based upon the International Shoe Co., McGee and Hanson cases. These
rules are:
" ( 1) The nonresident defendant must do some

act or consummate some transaction within the
forum. It is not necessary that defendant's agent
be physically within the forum, for this act or
transaction may be by mail only. A single event
will suffice if its effects within the state are substantial enough to qualify under Rule Three."
" ( 2) The cause of action must be one which

arises out of, or results from, the activities of the
defendant within the forum. It is conceivable that
the actual cause of action might come to fruition
in another state, but because of the activities of
defendant in the forum state there would still be
a 'substantial minimum contact.'"
"(3) Having established by Rules One and
Two a minimum contact between the defendant
and the state, the assumption of jurisdiction based
upon such contact must be consonant with the due
process tenants of 'fair play' and 'substantial justice.' If this test is fulfilled, there exists a 'substantial minimum contact' between the forum and
the defendant. The reasonableness of subjecting
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the defendant to jurisdiction under this rule is
frequently tested by standards analogous to those
of forum non conveniens."
In applying the factual situation in the instant case
now before this court to the three rules laid down by the
Ninth Circuit, we find:
( 1) That the defendant Louie's Boats & Motors

entered into a contract to purchase certain boats from
plaintiff, Hydroswift Corporation, which manufactured
the same at Salt Lake City, Utah.
( 2) It is to be noted that the contract, attached to
the affidavit of Hydroswift (R 14, 29) is lengthy and

involves more than the purchase of just one boat, but
many thousands of dollars worth of boats. The question
then arises, does the purchase of each and every boat
therein constitute a separate transaction, or is it all one
integrated transaction. Be as it may, insofar as Hydroswift is concerned, this is a transaction of a continuing
nature which involves many thousands of dollars worth
of product manufactured in Utah by a Utahn and sold
by Utahns in other states. The boats in question under
which this law suit was brought were boats which were
sold by invoice to the financing agency of the defendant,
the Oregon National Bank, with delivery of the boats to
the defendant Louie's. Upon receipt of the boats, Louie
did not pay for them nor did Oregon National Bank, but
Louie kept the boats and has not returned the same
thereby effectively converting the boats to his own uses
and purposes. The manner of the conversion, while it
9

physically occurred in Oregon, was made possible by
reason of the activities and connections of the defendant
with the plaintiff in the State of Utah, that is the manufacture and delivery of the boats from Utah to the defendant, and the representations made by defendant that
it would cause the Oregon National Bank to honor the
invoices and pay for the same. As pointed out in Rule
Two cited above; "it is conceivable that the actual cause
of action might come to fruition in another state, but because of the activities of defendant in the foreign state,
there would still be a substantial minimal contact."
In applying the fair play and substantial justice
doctrines, why should plaintiff be required to go to
the State of Oregon to maintain its action for conversion against the defendant, when the defendant purchased the boats in Utah, had them shipped from Utah
to its place of business, and then refused to pay for
them or cause others to pay for them and kept the boats.
The argument of fair play is, on balance, in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant. The defendant cannot
complain that it did not have notice of the pendency
of said action by reason of the fact that it was personally
served within the State of Oregon and given ample
opportunity to appear and defend, which obviously it
did by reason of the filing of its two motions to quash
service of summons. Therefore, defendant cannot say
that it did not have reasonable notice to defend.
The defendant may and does raise the question
as to whether or not the defendant purposely availed
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itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
foreign state, that is Utah. That it did by contracting
for the purchase of boats within the State of Utah
from a Utah corporation whose activities with respect
to the manufacture, development and sale of the boats
is within the State of Utah. It falls that the economic
loss to a resident corporation of Utah and to the employees and stockholders thereof vitally affects the legitimate interests of the State of Utah and therefore the
State of Utah does in fact have a continuing interest
in protecting the rights of its citizens, for it is obvious
that if losses of the magnitude involved herein were to
continue this hopefully profitable business would become
insolvent and thereby the State of Utah and the various
taxpayers and citizens located therein would suffer
thereby.
Questions have been raised in other jurisdictions
as to the relevancy of inconvenience. Is it any more
inconvenient for the plaintiff to go to Oregon than for
the defendant to come to Utah? It is submitted that
based upon fair play and inconvenience, it is no greater
a burden for the defendant to come to Utah than the
plaintiff to go to Oregon, and in fact by reason of the
defendant's alleged conduct, it should be required under
the doctrines of fair play to come to Utah to show the
alleged conversion was not in fact a conversion at all.
It is admitted by defendant in its affidavits on file that
it did in fact receive the boats, and in fact still has them.
It is admitted that they have not paid for them, however they do deny that they have converted them. If
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then, they still have the boats but have not paid for them,
and the invoice is correct in showing that the actual
purchaser was that of Oregon National Bank, their
affidavits leave little doubt but that they are holding
boats which they have no title to and have not returned,
and therefore are in fact guilty of conversion of the
boats.
The defendant, in its argument to the trial court,
argued that this was not a contact of such magnitude
or nature which would be significant contact within
the State of Utah, but merely a single act or transaction.
Many cases in other jurisdictions have been decided in favor of the "proposition that a single act or
transaction does invoke jurisdiction". These cases are
extensively summarized in 23 ALR 3rd commencing
on page 569 of this comprehensive annotation with
respect to jurisdicton over nonresidents under long arm
statutes.
POINT II
COMMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT WILL
INVOKE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
It is to be noted that the Utah long arm statute
allows jurisdiction over persons who have committed
a tortious act within this state. 78-27-24 ( 3) states:

"In causing any injury within this state,
whether tortious or by breach of warranty"
To apply a standard of a continuing course of
conduct is to completely nullify the effect of the long
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arm statute with respect to the commission of a tort,
when in fact in virtually all cases arising under the tort
theory of the long arm statute there, in all likelihood,
occurred only one single act, and that is the commission
of the tort itself. As an example, an automobile accident
or the sale of a clearly defective piece of equipment or
merchandise. The same can be said of a conversion,
and that is the gravamen of the amended complaint
of plaintiff on file in the instant case. It is to be noted
that under 78-27-24 (3), Utah Code Annotated, no
limitation is made by the Legislative enactment which
requires more than one act or a continuation of acts.
The only thing that is required is the causing of an
injury within this state, whether tortious or by breach
of warranty.
It is submitted that the conversion of property
belonging to a person is the causing of an injury to
that person, and if that person resides within this state,
the injury to that person has been caused to him within
this state even though the conversion occurred in another
state. It is to be noted that the invoice under which the
boats were sold is title retaining wherein it is expressly
stated that title does not pass until paid for.

Under New York law, which provides in part that
a non-resident shall be held amenable to jurisdiction
of the New York courts where he commits a tortio11s
act within the state, the case of Nixson v. Ira Haupt
& Co. (1964) 44 MISC 2d 629, 254 NYS 2d 637, held
that the New York court would have jurisdiction over
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a complaint founded upon conversion. The court pointed
out that conversion was a "tortious act". In the case of
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Ricliardson, 59
MISC 2d 744, 300 NYS 2d 757, the New York courts
again held that conversion of an automobile would subject the person committing the tort to the New York
courts, even though the conversion was committed outside the state, as the injury wa s to a person within the
state.
In a case arising in the state of Washington out
of transactions involving fraudulent real estate sales.
the Washington Supreme Court, in the case of Bowen
v. Bateman (1969) ...... Wash ...... , 458 P.2d 269, the
court said:
"Assuming, arguendo, that all tortious acts in
this case were committed outside the state of
Washington, if the injury is sustained within the
state, then the tortious acts and the injury are inseparable and jurisdiction lies in Washington
where the injury occurred." (Citing cases)
This particular case sets forth in synopsis form the
various decisions arising under the Washington long
arm statute which illustrate the classes of acts which
have been held to constitute sufficient contact in 'Vashington to place the actors within the reach of the long
arm statute, either on the basis of transacting business
or in committing a tortious act.
Hawaii, in the case of Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd.
v. Hollingsworth (CA 9 Hawaii) 417 F.2d 231, held
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that jurisdiction would lie under the long arm statute
where the acts complained of took place outside of
Hawaii but the injury occurred within the state.
While all of the jurisdictions are not in accord with
allowing jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where
the act complained of occurs outside of the state but
the injury occurs within the state, many jurisdictions
h'tve so held and they are the better reasoned cases.
A fairly recent annotation with respect to this
subject summarizes the cases, both to the pro and con
of the matter, and is found in 24 ALR 3d 532. In this
annotation, it is to be noted that Colorado has construed its law wherein the legislature sets forth the term
"tortious acts" as meaning that there must be a unity
between the tort and the act committed. This is distinguishable from the Utah law which does not set forth
that there has to be a tortious act, but merely that the
injury was caused whether tortious or by breach of
warranty. Consequently, the Colorado cases are of no
help in determining what the law of Utah is with respect
to the applicability of its long arm statute.
The court is respectfully referred to the annotation
in 24 ALR 3d 532, commencing at page 565, for a
compilation of cases dealing with instate injurious consequences arising from out-of-state wrongs.
The 1959 Utah case of Conn v. Whitmore, 9 U.2d
250, 342 P.2d 871, does raise the spector of a case which
is, to some extent, similar to the case now at bar and
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which would appear to be in conflict with the position
taken by the plaintiff-appellant. In that case a judgment
was rendered in Illinois against a Utah resident who
had purchases horses in Illinois. The Utah court held
that Illinois had no jurisdiction over the defendant and
alluded to a distinction between the seller of a product
and a buyer of a product.
The Conn v. Whitmore case decided prior to the
enactment of the long arm statute is distinguishable
from the case at bar by reason of the fact that in that
case a question of contract was involved, and the breach
thereof, but in the instant case the tort of conversion
is involved which now has given rise to a right of action
under the amended laws of Utah which were passed
some ten years after the Conn v. Wliitmore case. The
Utah Supreme Court in a 1970 case dealt with the Idaho
long arm statute in Van Kleeck Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products Co., Inc., et al, 24 U.2d 63, 465
P.2d 544. In this case it was alleged in the Idaho action
that the defendants had committed a tort in Idaho and
therefore had subjected themselves to jurisdiction of
the Idaho court. The judgment as rendered by the
Idaho court was pointed out by the Utah high court
not to have indicated that the judgment was based upon
a tort. The Utah Supreme Court held that the Idaho
judgment was not binding upon the Utah courts by
reason of the lack of jurisdiction over the individually
named <lefendants who were found by the Utah lower
court to have been acting in their corporate capacities
in all of their activities which took place in Idaho. This
16

case is of little importance in making a determination
as to the case now before the court, other than to point
out that the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
there is a difference between a tort action and a contract
action.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Hul
v. Vail Corp., (1971), .... U.2d .... , 482 P.2d 332, discusses the recent trends of the long arm statutes, and
the Court observed:
"If there is any difference between what is
stated as the 'doing business' and the 'minimal
contacts' test, it is probably more in samantics
than in substance. In practical application, they
are essentially the same. 'Vhen the problem arises,
its solution depends on whether it can fairly be
said that the corporation is doing business within
the state in a real and substantial sense."
Here again, however, the Hill v. Vail case is one founded on contract, to wit: an employment contract, and
not a tort action. However, the Supreme Court did state
with finality:
"These further observations are pertinent:
while the place where the activities giving rise to
the cause of action occurred is a factor to be considered, it is not essential that they occurred in
this state." (Citing cases)
The court went on to note that where hardship or
inconvenience is plead, hardship and inconvenience to
a plaintiff should be given consideration to a court,
which is certainly the case now before the court.
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Under the Hill case, the law of Utah is settled that
the commission of a tort in one state with resulting injury in Utah will give rise to jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court
erred in quashing the service of summons in this matter,
as the court had jurisdiction by reason of the injury
suffered by plaintiff through the tortious activity of
defendant to adjudicate the rights of the parties.
It is respectfully submitted that the significant
minimal contacts of defendant within this state were
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Utah courts.

Respectfully submitted,
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of
COTRO-MANES, FANKHAUSER
& BEASLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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